Tag Archives: education policy

Is the DfE’s Teacher Supply Model outdated?

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For most of my adult life, the government department responsible for the supply of teachers, whether it was called the DfE, DES, DfEE or by another name, has used a version of the Teacher Supply Model to calculate future teacher needs, and presumably to ensure the government doesn’t waste money training too many teachers.

Training too few teachers, not as a result of the Model, but because of under-recruitment into training, has been a problem for the Teacher Supply Model (TSM) during periods of teacher shortage. Do you either add the under-recruitment to the TSM target in any one year to the next year’s TSM total, thus making it even harder to reach, or do you accept every school starts each new school year in September fully staffed, so there are no vacancies to be filled, even if additional trainees just happened to be recruited. Over the past forty years, both approaches have been tried: neither really works.

I first came across the TSM in the late 1980s when, in response to a Select Committee Report, a technical document explaining the working of the TSM at that time was published. Between the late 1980s, and a seminal announcement, also to a Select committee, by David Laws when he was the Minister of State that the TSM would be part of open government, the TSM remained largely secret, apart from one other document published in the late 1980s in repose to yet another two Select Committee reports.

Why were successive government keen to keep the TSM under wraps? Possibly because the workings allowed for an understanding of future government policy. There are three obvious areas where changes in policy can have consequences for schools and society that might create political debate: reactions to future pupil numbers, whether up or down; changes in education funding that might allow more or less funds for schools; policy changes such as extending the learning leaving age or the introduction of a new subject, such as citizenship or computing. All impact on the TSM

Governments often don’t want to signal policy changes ahead of time, especially if they might be controversial. In the first decade of this century, the secrecy around the TSM almost caught out the ITT sector when falling rolls together with improved ITT recruitment made a reduction in ITT numbers inevitable for secondary subjects, especially as there was no policy around improving staffing levels in the secondary sector, partly because of the decision over the introduction of non-contact time in the primary sector.

Planning is an essential too of any organisation, including governments, whatever extreme free-market thinkers may say. After years of following the consequences of the TSM decisions on the outcomes for the teacher labour market, I have some concerns about what happens when the TSM has been run for any particular year. The elements of the TSM have changed over the years, as explained above in relation to under-recruitment as an example. That’s not an issue for me, although the discussions with the sector may have helped prevent some changes to the TSM in mor recent times.

What is at the core of my concerns about the TSM is the length of time between the collection of the data for input into the TSM and the consequences for the real-time labour market for any September recruitment round, let alone the needs for teachers to fill any January vacancies.

I acknowledge that improved and faster data collection over time thanks to better computing capabilities has helped reduce the time taken between data collection and the effect on the labour market of the TSM output for any recruitment round. Currently, data from the 2025 School Workforce Survey, collected in November 2025, will probably influence the TSM run for the 2027 entry into training, and hence, the 2028 labour market.

At least with most trainees now on a one-year postgraduate training route, there is no longer the issue of a four-year undergraduate course to add into the mix. The November 2025 data collected, if such courses were still a significant part of the ITT scene, would not affect the labour market until 2031. A lot can happen in the intervening years.

Even with the shorter training period, there is still a time lag between data collection and the consequences of that data on the labour market.

My question is, should a further check be added once the TSM has been used to calculate ITT targets, in order to allow the comparison between the TSM target and the current reality of the labour market?

The DfE now has excellent data from several years of operating its own vacancy platform, and there are also private operators monitoring the labour market with useful vacancy data in real time. This data can be compared with the TSM output target to allow a discussion about the validity of the TSM target to current labour market needs.

Now, it may well be that the TSM number is the best fit for training needs, but as my previous post that considered the labour market data for teachers of music alongside the ITT target cut that presumably emerged from the TSM output has suggested, the addition of vacancy data does allow for a debate about whether the TSM target under or over estimates demand. Music ITT: has the government made a mistake? | John Howson

Such use of vacancy data also allows for a consideration of policy changes, such as how schools react to a change in a market where QTS still allows any teacher to teach any subject to any child, and ‘permits the use of unqualified staff. where nobody with QTS is either available or considered sufficiently expert at delivering the curriculum.  

The TSM isn’t outdated, just, in my opinion, no longer enough by itself to ensure an orderly labour market for teachers.

Why is this important, it is because the market does play a part in determining how shortages are dealt with. Where are the qualified teachers of physics teaching? How much more do schools with high levels of free school meals have to spend on recruitment than a school with fewer such pupils? Important questions around the staffing of the nation’s schools.

I read the Fed report on education issued yesterday National Education Report 2026 – FED and believe that the supply of teachers and school leaders is still at the heart of any effective system of education.

How any government determines teacher supply is a vital decision affecting the lives of many young people. Ensuring every child has the best possible teachers throughout their whole school-life is equally as important as whether or not they are banned from social media, but much less often discussed.

I think that teacher supply issues should be much higher up the education agenda, but I would, wouldn’t I, having spent a career worrying about teacher supply matters.   

Are rainy day savings by schools affecting outcomes?

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Is there any relationship between the reserves a school holds and the outcomes for its pupils? One thesis might be that schools that spend more of their revenue budgets, and don’t add to their reserves each year, do better for their pupils than those schools more concerned with ‘saving for a rainy day’ or adding to their reserves for some other reason. Of course, this thesis only really works with a funding model that funds schools appropriately. Nevertheless, it is question worth asking.

This post looks at the evidence around the relationship between the quoted reserves of the primary schools across three multi-academy trusts (MATs) of differing sizes. The schools are in a range of different locations, and have a range of pupil numbers, but are all located within the boundaries of a single local authority.

KS2 achievement Percentage %No of KS2 Pupils 24/25 reserves per KS2 pupil
4230 £        24,333
6916 £        16,313
6422 £        16,273
3625 £        14,480
2711 £        12,364
9111 £        12,249
4715 £        10,600
3429 £        10,172
6913 £        10,077
5016 £          9,375
5016 £          8,688
3327 £          7,667
5645 £          7,267
5648 £          6,896
6916 £          6,813
6939 £          6,692
9315 £          5,933
5831 £          5,484
8318 £          5,287
8211 £          5,091
7218 £          5,000
6531 £          4,258
5022 £          4,182
5531 £          4,129
4821 £          4,098
7359 £          3,847
5028 £          3,536
7315 £          3,467
7528 £          3,214
4827 £          3,111
7061 £          2,738
6758 £          2,535
9123 £          2,531
5657 £          2,509
8323 £          2,087
5944 £          1,864
7131 £          1,677
5770 £          1,614
9212 £          1,362
5260 £              950
7629 £              862
7260 £              700
5618 £              611
4529-£         1,655
8614-£         1,714
7919-£         2,474
5831-£         3,084
867-£         3,295
8938-£         4,756
5315-£         8,667
4825-£       11,040

The range of reserves, as taken from the reserves in the accounts filed at Companies House by the MAT, vary per KS2 pupil from a high of £24,333 per pupil, to £611 for schools with those schools with reserves. Eight schools are shown as having deficits

Leaving aside, at this point for schools with deficits, it is worth comparing the other schools in the table with the average outcome for all pupils in the local authority of 62%.

The schools in the table, are of different sizes. In the schools in the table the range of KS2 pupils extends from schools with just 11 KS2 pupils, to one with 70 KS2 pupils. Where a school has a stable intake, the KS2 reserves per pupil is easy to spread across the schools, although some schools still start pupils, at age 5, many at age 4 and a few even younger and with a nursery class, and this may make a difference to reserves.

In this era of falling rolls, allied to parental choice, some school’s KS2 numbers would overestimate the school population if grossed up across all year groups. For that reason, I have just used the KS2 pupil number for this exercise.

Six of the top 10 schools with the highest reserves per pupil had achievements below the local authority level of 62%. This compares with four of the ten schools with the lowest reserves (not with a deficit).

It is interesting to note that one MAT has 12 schools in the top 15 schools with the largest reserves per KS2 pupil, and 15 in the top 20 schools. Of the other two MATS, one has three schools in the top 20 schools by reserves per KS2 pupil, and the other just two schools.

I suspect that both these MATs more actively work with their schools than the other MAT in terms of making use of their cashflow. All the schools in this latter MAT in the top 20 by reserves are also well above average for performance levels. The position is more mixed for the other smaller MAT, but I suspect its policy is evolving as it has acquired more schools.

How much does parental choice, and falling rolls play a part in determining reserves? Certainly, primary schools that have no spare places across all year groups will do better with a funding model that is weighted towards pupil numbers than schools unable to make full classes even by mixing year groups together. In another post, I will look at school size and reserves.

It would be interesting to conduct this exercise across all schools in a local authority. However, pooling of reserves by some MATs, and a lack of visibility for the reserves of maintained and voluntary schools makes that task effectively impossible.

No doubt the DfE could ask the question about why there is so much difference in reserves per pupil between schools, and could ask if some schools could achieve more for their pupils if they kept less in their reserves? School governors, MAT trustees and the teacher associations, as well as local politicians, might also like to ask this question.

Bring Back Circular 1 each year?

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Recently, I wrote a post about a Schoolsweek’s story about the DfE and the need to manage ‘sufficiency’ ITT review: DfE forms ‘sufficiency’ group amid places fears (schoolsweek.co.uk) by creating a new group than most people either didn’t seem to be aware of or didn’t know who comprised the membership. ITT places need a review: but not behind closed doors | John Howson (wordpress.com)

Anyway, I was thinking about what the Group might consider if its aim is to ensure that as many schools as possible are able to recruit the most appropriately qualified teachers to fill their vacancies.

Of course, apart from cutting the numbers of trainees to keep them in line with the predictions from the Teacher Supply Model, the Group could decide to do nothing, and just let the current market-based system continue with vacancies advertised, and teachers applying and the private sector making £40,000,000 or more per year from recruitment. (n.b. I am Chair at TeachVac, the job board).

At the other end of the intervention spectrum, the DfE could follow the actions of their predecessors in the Ministry of Education and return to publishing circular 1. This told local authorities each year how many new entrants from training they could employ. If they wanted more teachers, then there were either returners or teachers moving schools or unqualified staff that could be employed. This draconian approach no doubt worked well in the total planning economy of the immediate post-World War Two years, but probably wouldn’t work now, especially with the disparate system of school governance and the lack of a coherent middle tier in schooling that currently exists across England.

However, a variation on that theme would be to create all teachers as government employees and assign them to schools, as happens in some other countries. My guess is that model won’t work with a government pledged to reduce the civil service by some 90,000 employees.  Creating teachers as civil servants might seem to send out the wrong message about the power of the state.

So how else might the government manage the distribution of the ‘sufficient’ new teachers they are aiming to train to help reduce the inequalities currently in the system? Two possible solutions are, either tighten up on QTS by first making it a requirement for academies to ‘normally’ only hire teachers with QTS, and then segment QTS so it is aligned with the preparation course a person undertakes. This would mean those on primary sector courses would not have QTS to teach in the secondary sector, and visa versa. At present, any teacher with QTS can teach anything to any child at any level. In the secondary sector, QTS might become subject specific.

To deal with ‘shortages’ emergency certification could be provided for a limited period, with CPD to allow for full certification if the teachers was going to be employed teaching in that area permanently. This would also show where shortages were affecting schools and make effective use of the CPD budget.

The other alternative is to expand the Opportunity Area scheme by providing certain schools with additional cash to compete in the market to hire teachers in shortage subjects. However, without caping the spending of other schools, this approach just risks developing a race to see who can pay the most for their teachers. Good news for teachers, especially in shortage subjects, but possibly not the best use of resources.

With a significant number of career changers thinking of teaching as a career, a training salary might be a useful tool ensure these would-be teachers can make the switch into teaching. At the same time, ensuring a job for every successful trainee in the September after their course ends is worth considering. At present, those teachers needed to fill January appointment can find themselves without a job during the autumn term; a waste of talent and a loss of skills. Taking such teachers on as supernumeraries, paid from central funds, on the understanding that they are applying for posts would be worth considering.

Of course, none of these initiatives may be necessary if the recession throws up lots more returners to teaching that are the right mix of skills and in the right locations.  

To make decisions about any such scheme to consider needs high quality up to the minute knowledge of the labour market for teachers and school leaders, as well as the ability to understand the data and its implications. Fortunately, in NfER and our higher education sector, the government has the skills available to it to help answer these questions.

But it could abandon levelling up and just leave it to the market for teachers that is now not local, nor national, but global, in its reach for the high-quality teachers produced through the current teacher preparation system in England.